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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a car crash case which caused injuries to Hansen and property damage to 
Roberts' vehicle. 
II. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT 
The case was tried to a jury and a verdict was returned finding both parties 
negligent. The jury determined that Hansen was 90 percent at fault and Roberts was 10 
percent at fault. The jury awarded damages to Roberts in the amount of$3,776.82. 
The case was originally assigned to the Honorable Gregory Anderson until he 
retired, shortly before trial. The Honorable Jon Shindurling presided briefly over the case 
but assigned the case to the Honorable William H. Woodland for trial. The Honorable 
Dane H. Watkins is currently presiding over the case. 
III. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Hansen made a right hand tum into a business parking stall when his vehicle was 
struck on the passenger side by Roberts, who attempted to pass Hansen on the right. The 
point of impact occurred where the road approached an intersection and started to widen 
from a single lane to three lanes: a left tum lane, straight lane, and a right tum lane. 




































ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
ISSUE #1: Whether the trial court erred in allowing Roberts to introduce expert 
opinion testimony from an accident reconstructionist and biomechanical engineer when 
(1) Roberts' expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient, (2) the testimony invaded 
the jury's province, and (3) there was a lack of foundation to support the opinions. 
ISSUE #2: Whether the court erred by ruling that Hansen waived the right to 
object at trial to the introduction of portions of Roberts' deposition. 
ISSUE #3: Whether the trial court erred by precluding Hansen from questioning 
the voir dire panel regarding employment or association with insurance companies or risk 
management. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE #1: Expert Testimony 
A. Exclusion of Witnesses Due to Non-Compliance with Scheduling Order 
and Untimely Discovery Responses 
A trial court has authority to sanction parties for non-compliance with pretrial 
orders. The imposition of sanctions for non-compliance with pretrial orders and untimely 
discovery responses is committed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be 
overturned absent a manifest abuse of that discretion. When determining whether a 
district court abused its discretion, this Court considers three factors: (1) whether the trial 
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court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) whether it acted within the 
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal principles, and (3) 
whether it reached its decision through an exercise of reason. See Edmunds v. Kraner, 
142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006). 
B. Admission of Expert Testimony 
This Court reviews trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence, 
including the testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard. 
Morris By and Through Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 
(1997). In the case of an incorrect ruling regarding evidence, a new trial is merited only 
if the error affects a substantial right of one of the parties. Id. 
ISSUE #2: Error Regarding Waiver of Deposition Objections 
This Court reviews errors regarding admissibility of evidence under a harmless 
error standard. An error is harmless unless a different result would have been probable 
had the error not occurred. See Davidson v. Beco Corp., 112 Idaho 560, 733 P .2d 781 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1987) and Idaho R. Civ. P. 61. 
ISSUE #3: Voir Dire 
The standard of review for a district court's limitations on jury voir dire is an 
abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d 374, 379 
(1969). 
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ARGUMENT 
ISSUE #1: The trial court erred in allowing Roberts to introduce expert opinion 
testimony from an accident reconstructionist and biomechanical engineer when (1) 
Roberts' pretrial expert disclosures were untimely and insufficient, (2) the testimony 
invaded the jury's province, and (3) there was a lack of foundation to support the 
opinions because they were not scientifically reliable. 
A. Roberts' Disclosures Were Untimely and Insufficient 
The trial court abused its discretion by allowing Roberts to introduce expert 
testimony from expert witnesses when Roberts violated the trial court's scheduling order 
and failed to make timely and sufficient pretrial disclosures pursuant to discovery 
requests. "This Court reviews trial court decisions admitting or excluding evidence, 
including the testimony of expert witnesses, under the abuse of discretion standard." 
Morris By and Through Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 
(1997) and See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006). When 
determining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Court considers three 
factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable 
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legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an exercise of reason. 
See Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006). 
This Court has previously held that a trial court abused its discretion and 
committed reversible error by allowing expert testimony that was not properly disclosed 
in violation of rule 26. See Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 P.2d 897 
(1991). This Court explained in Radmer the purpose of the rule requiring pretrial expert 
witness disclosures: 
Id. 
It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination, and 
this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to pretrial 
discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved. . . . Before an 
attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination with an unfavorable 
expert opinion he [or she] must have some idea of the bases of that opinion 
and the data relied upon. If an attorney is required to await examination at 
trial to get this information, he [or she] often will have too little time to 
recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the testimony. 
The burden of providing the disclosures is on the party intending to introduce the 
testimony. See Clarkv. Klein, 45 P.3d 810 (Idaho 2002). Thus, this Court held in Clark 
that the trial court erred by shifting the burden to the adverse party to file a motion to 
compel the disclosure when the party introducing the expert testimony failed to make 
timely or sufficient disclosures. See id. at n. 1. 
Additionally, rule 26(e)(1)(B) requires a party to "seasonably" supplement 
discovery responses directed at expert discovery. The trial court may exclude testimony 
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offered by a party who failed to seasonably supplement a disclosure. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 
26(e)(4). "[A]n important inquiry in determining whether a response was given 
'seasonably' is: was the opposing party given an opportunity for full cross examination?" 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (Idaho 2006). 
In making its decision on whether to impose a sanction, the trial court should 
request an explanation of the late disclosure, weigh the importance of the testimony in 
question, determine the time needed for preparation to meet the testimony, and consider 
the possibility of a continuance. See Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 647 P.2d 311 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1982). 
In this case, the trial court entered a scheduling order requiring each party to 
disclose the identity of expert witnesses at least 90 days before trial. See R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
The scheduling order precluded either party from conducting discovery after 70 days 
before trial and required all discovery to be submitted so that responses would be due 
prior to the discovery cutoff date. See R. p. 35 and n.2. 
The following time line shows relevant expert discovery and disclosure dates: 
November 23, 2009 - Hansen Serves Rule 26(b)( 4) Interrogatory on Roberts. See 
R. Vol. I, p. 1. 
July 21, 2010 - Expert Witness Identity Disclosure Deadline. See R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
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July 21, 2010 - Roberts Discloses Scott Kimbrough as Potential Expert Witness. 
See R. Vol. I, p. 38. 
August 9,2010 - Discovery Cutoff. See R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
August, 2010- Roberts Retains Scott Kimbrough. See Tr. Vol. I, p. 379, LL. 17-
25. 
September 24, 2010 - Roberts Provides Partial Rule 26(b)(4) Answer to 
Interrogatory for Scott Kimbrough. See R. Vol. I, p. 86. 
September 29,2010 - Roberts Hires John Droge. See R. Vol. I, p. Ill. 
October 1, 2010 - Roberts Discloses John Droge to Hansen. See R. Vol. I, p. 111. 
October 4,2010 - Roberts Provides Partial Rule 26(b)(4) Answer to Interrogatory 
for John Droge. See R. Vol. I, p. 119. 
October 19, 2010 - Roberts Provides Hansen with Scene Diagram Created by 
Scott Kimbrough. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 359, LL. 8-10. 
October 19,2010 - Trial. See R. Vol. I, p. 34. 
Prior to the examination by Roberts of his expert witnesses, Hansen sought 
exclusion of the experts. The trial court held a hearing outside the presence of the jury. 
During the hearing, Hansen's counsel informed the court of the late and incomplete 
disclosures. Hansen's counsel pointed out to the court that the disclosures only came a 
couple of weeks before trial and that they did not include a disclosure of compensation, 
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prior cases in which they had testified at trial or deposition, and in Droge's case, the basis 
of his opinions or the data he used to support his opinions. See Tr. Vol. 1., pp. 328-332. 
Roberts' counsel noted that Hansen did seek rule 26(b)( 4) disclosures but 
suggested that her disclosures were timely even though they were made just before trial 
and well past the expert disclosure deadlines imposed by the court's scheduling order. 
See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 332, LL. 13-25 through p. 333, L. 23. Roberts' counsel argued that 
Hansen should have filed a motion to compel or a motion in limine to address the issue at 
a prior time. See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 333, LL. 16-23. 
The trial court listened to arguments of counsel and then summarily ruled that the 
experts would testifY: 
THE COURT: All right. They will be allowed to testifY. 
MR. GORDON: Based on what, the identity of Dr. Droge? He wasn't even told -
we didn't even know until-
THE COURT: Your objection is noted. 
Tr. Vol. I., p. 338, LL. 10-16. 
As noted above, a trial court abuses its discretion by failing to (1) perceive the 
issue as one of discretion, (2) act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently 
with applicable legal principles, and (3) reach its decision through an exercise of reason. 
The trial court failed on all three accounts. The trial court's conclusory ruling does not 
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satisty its obligation to perceive the issues as one of discretion, provide the parties or this 
Court any indication that it reached it's decision through an exercise of reason, or 
determine whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal principles. Instead, the parties and this Court are left to speculate as to 
the reasoning behind the trial court's ruling. 
To the extent the trial court relied on Roberts' counsel's argument that the burden 
was on Hansen to file a motion to compel, that reasoning clearly violates the second 
prong of the abuse of discretion test. See Clark v. Klein, 45 P.3d 810, 814 n. 1 and 815 
(Idaho 2002) (holding that trial judge's decision to allow expert testimony despite 
untimely rule 26(b)( 4) disclosures failed the second part of test by indicating "that the 
burden was on Appellants to file a motion to compel the substance of the testimony."). 
Further, as this Court pointed out in Edmunds, the trial court should determine 
whether the discovery responses were "seasonably" supplemented by affording Hansen 
with an opportunity for full cross examination. This Court in Edmunds held that a 
supplemental disclosure made eight months before trial was not an abuse of discretion 
because it gave the opposing party an opportunity to undertake additional discovery and 
prepare a cross examination. Unlike the disclosing party in Edmunds, Roberts' 
supplemental discovery providing partial 26(b )( 4) disclosures did not come until after the 
discovery cutoff deadline and just weeks before trial. 
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Particularly disturbing was the production of a scene diagram created by 
Kimbrough and produced on the day of trial. The trial court admitted the diagram into 
evidence without any explanation or reasoning supporting its ruling. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 
359, LL. 6-11. 
The trial court abused its discretion by summarily ruling that Roberts' experts 
could testifY when the trial court failed to (1) perceive the issue as one of discretion, (2) 
act within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
principles, and (3) reach its decision through an exercise of reason. The case law 
provided by Hansen shows similar examples where this Court has found an abuse of 
discretion when trial courts admit expert testimony when the disclosures were untimely 
and violated the trial court's scheduling order or were made shortly before trial. This 
Court has noted that untimely disclosures preclude the opposing party from preparing an 
effective cross examination of the witness. A new trial is warranted because the trial 
court's abuse of discretion affected a substantial right of Hansen - the ability to 
effectively prepare a cross-examination of Roberts' expert witnesses. Accordingly, 
Hansen respectfully requests that this Court vacate the judgment and remand the case to 
the trial court for a new trial. 
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B. Kimbrough Invaded the Province of the Jury 
The trial court erred in allowing Kimbrough to testifY about whether Hansen or 
Roberts were negligent because it is inappropriate to allow an expert to provide testimony 
on subjects that are not beyond the common sense of the average juror. Expert testimony 
is allowed if it will assist the trier of fact. See Idaho R. Evid. 702. However, expert 
testimony is not allowed where the normal experience and qualifications of lay jurors 
permit them to draw proper conclusions from given facts and circumstances. See 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637, 647; 39 P.3d 577, 588 (Idaho 2001) and State v. 
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 695; 760 P.2d 27,34 (Idaho 1988) (noting that expert testimony is 
not admissible if the expert is not better equipped than a lay person). Further, an expert 
may not enter the realm of fact-finding that is well within the capacity of a lay jury and 
render an opinion regarding the weight of disputed evidence. See State v. Hester, 114 
Idaho 688,696; 760 P.2d 27,35 (Idaho 1988). 
Kimbrough testified that the accident was caused by Hansen's careless right hand 
turn. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 357, LL. 14-17. Kimbrough developed his opinion by reading the 
police report, reading Hansen's deposition, looking at the accident site on Google Earth, 
visiting the accident site, and speaking with an ex-highway patrolman. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 
356, L. 7 through p. 357, L. 4. Kimbrough testified that his opinions were based on his 
personal weighing of the evidence. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 374 L. 15 through p. 375, L. 15. 
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Kimbrough testified that he is no better than the jury in weighing the evidence. See Ir. 
Vol. I., p. 375, LL. 5-15. Kimbrough testified that Roberts' conduct was reasonable and 
that Hansen's conduct was not reasonable. See Ir. Vol. I., p. 369, L. 19 through p. 370, 
L. 22. 
Jurors are presumably drivers or have driven in cars and are adequately qualified 
to determine whether Hansen or Roberts' actions are negligent. Kimbrough did nothing 
beyond review the evidence that was presented to the jurors to reach his conclusions. 
Kimbrough's testimony did not assist the jury to understand the evidence or to determine 
a fact in the case. Instead, his testimony was, admittedly, simply his own interpretation 
of the facts after he personally weighed the evidence. Kimbrough admitted that the jury 
was just as qualified as him to come to its own conclusions regarding the fault of the 
parties. Accordingly, the trial court erred by admitting Kimbrough's own personal 
opinions about the fault of the parties since his testimony was within the normal 
experience and qualifications of lay jurors. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that the admissibility of 
expert testimony is a matter of discretion, by failing to act within the outer boundaries of 
that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and reach its decision 
through the exercise of reason. As was the case for the late disclosures, the trial court 
made a conclusory ruling that Kimbrough could testifY so there was no acknowledgment 
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by the trial court that the ruling was a matter of discretion and there was no record that 
the trial court reached its decision through the exercise of reason. Further, the trial court 
did not act consistent with applicable legal standards because expert testimony is not 
admissible to testifY regarding the negligence of drivers involved in an automobile crash. 
This Court should vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new trial because 
the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Kimbrough's testimony. A new trial is 
warranted because the trial court's abuse of discretion affected a substantial right of 
Hansen - the ability to have the case decided by a jury of peers without an invasion of the 
jury's province by Roberts' paid expert. 
C. Droge's Testimony was not Scientifically Reliable 
The trial court erred in allowing Droge testifY because Roberts failed to provide 
adequate foundation that Droge's testimony was scientifically reliable. Expert testimony 
is only admissible if it is based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge 
and will assist the trier of fact. See Idaho R. Evid. 702. 
To detennine whether scientific knowledge will assist the trier of fact, a trial court 
must make a two-step inquiry: (1) detennine that the underlying scientific principles are 
reliable and (2) detennine that the scientific principles or methodology were properly 
applied by the expert. See State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520,522; 81 P.3d 1230, 1232 (Idaho 
2003) (noting that a trial court must make a "preliminary assessment of whether the 
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reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether 
that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue."). 
For example, this Court found that expert testimony regarding polygraph test 
results was not admissible and that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the 
test results because polygraph testing was not shown to be scientifically reliable. See id. 
at 524-25, and 1234-35. So in Perry, the first step of the inquiry - showing that the 
underlying scientific principles were reliable - was not established. 
In State v. Williamson, 144 Idaho 597, 600; 166 P.3d 387, 390 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2007), the court of appeals held that laser speed detection devices are scientifically 
reliable. It made that determination based, in part, on case law from other jurisdictions 
accepting the reliability of laser speed detection. However, the court of appeals noted 
that the State still had to meet the second step of admissibility by showing that the officer 
using a laser device was qualified, that the unit was properly maintained, and that it was 
used correctly. Id. 
Biomechanical engineering is not necessarily scientifically reliable. In 2008, the 
Nevada Supreme Court, after affirming the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony by 
a biomechanical engineer, noted that, unlike radar detection devices, it was not aware of 
any jurisdiction that had judicially noticed the general reliability of biomechanical 
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engineering or its ability to assess the cause of personal injuries in automobile accidents. 
See Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 653 (Nev. 2008). 
On the contrary, the Nevada Supreme Court cited to a number of cases that 
excluded testimony from a biomechanical engineer because it was not reliable. One case 
that is highly relevant is Reali v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D. Me. 
2000). In Reali, the court excluded a biomechanical engineer's testimony regarding 
accident forces because the court found that the methodology used to determine the 
forces was unreliable. The biomechanical engineer determined that the Delta V, or 
change in velocity of the vehicle, was 12 m.ph. Knowing the change in velocity would 
allow the engineer to calculate the forces imposed on a passenger in the vehicle and then 
render an opinion whether those forces were sufficient to cause an injury. The 
biomechanical engineer derived the Delta V by assumptions made from viewing 
photographs of the damaged automobile. The court found that no evidence was presented 
to show that eyeballing property damage photographs was an acceptable method to derive 
Delta V. 
In this case, Roberts did not lay the foundation showing that biomechanical 
engineering is scientifically reliable. Instead, Roberts merely asked Droge what 
biomechanical engineering was and whether he had a degree in biomechanical 
engineering. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 392 L. 13 through p. 393, L. 9. Thus, Roberts did not lay 
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a foundation to meet the first step of the analysis - to show that biomechanical 
engmeerIng is scientifically reliable in determining the causation of injuries in car 
crashes. 
It became clear as Droge's testimony developed that he made an unscientific and 
subjective determination of changes of velocity based on eyeballing photographs. Droge 
admits that he made a subjective guess of the accident forces (a function of Delta V or 
change of velocity) by simply eyeballing the property damage photographs and reviewing 
the repair damage estimates. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 391, LL. 3-5; p. 398, LL. 17-20; p. 399, 
LL. 14-15; p. 414, LL. 7-15 (the change of velocity is an estimate based on damage to the 
vehicles). Droge made all other determinations of speeds or angles of the vehicles and 
other unknowns from his initial gut feeling regarding the change of velocity. See Tr. Vol. 
1., p. 417 LL. 6-7 (you take this change of velocity, and we're working to other 
unknowns). Droge then stated that he compared his eyeball guess to a database of 70,000 
other car crashes and "believed" that he found 2 crashes that supported his guess but did 
not provide any details of the crashes. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 419, LL. 1-2. 
At the end of the day, all Droge did was eyeball photos of the vehicles and make 
a guess as to what kind of forces were involved in the crash and, not surprisingly, he 
found that the forces were insufficient to cause an injury. As noted in Reali, eyeballing a 
couple of photographs is not sufficient to lay a foundation to show that the testimony is 
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scientifically reliable. Further, like Hallmark, Roberts did not offer any evidence that 
biomechanics is a recognized field of expertise, that Droge's opinion was capable of 
being tested or that it had been tested, that Droge's theories had been published or 
subjected to peer review, or that his opinions were accepted to any degree in the scientific 
community. Finally, Droge formed his opinions without knowing the vehicles' starting 
positions, their speeds at impact, the length of time that the vehicles were in contact 
during impact, or the angle at which the vehicles collided - these are all admittedly 
unknowns and his calculations of these unknowns are all derived from his initial guess of 
the change of velocity. See Tr. Vol. L, p. 399, LL. 14-15. 
The trial court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that the admissibility 
of expert testimony is a matter of discretion, by failing to act within the outer boundaries 
of that discretion and consistent with applicable legal standards, and reach its decision 
through the exercise of reason. The trial court made a conclusory ruling that Droge's 
testimony was admissible so there was no acknowledgment by the trial court that the 
ruling was a matter of discretion and there was no record that the trial court reached its 
decision through the exercise of reason. Further, the trial court did not act consistent with 
applicable legal standards because expert testimony is not admissible unless the trial 
court makes a two-step inquiry to ensure that underlying scientific principles are reliable 
and were properly applied. The Court did not undergo any inquiry regarding the 
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foundation for Droge's testimony. This Court should vacate the judgment and remand 
the case for a new trial because the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Droge's 
testimony. A new trial is warranted because the trial court's abuse of discretion affected 
a substantial right of Hansen - the right to have the case decided by admissible evidence 
and not unreliable and unscientific guesses. 
ISSUE #2: The trial court erred in ruling that Hansen waived the 
objections he made during Roberts' video deposition. 
The trial court erred when it ruled that Hansen waived the objections he made 
during Roberts' video deposition by not addressing those objections during a scheduled 
hearing to review jury instructions. A party may object at the trial to receiving in 
evidence any deposition for any reason which would require the exclusion of the 
evidence if the witness were then present and testifying. See Idaho R. Civ. P. 32(b). 
Roberts' video deposition was taken for purposes of trial. During the deposition, 
Hansen's counsel raised a number of objections during the deposition and Roberts' 
counsel raised a number of objections during Hansen's cross examination of Roberts. 
Roberts' counsel agreed at the conclusion of the deposition to provide the trial court with 
a copy of the deposition transcript and review the objections prior to trial so she could 
edit the video deposition to remove inadmissible testimony. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 259. 
Instead, Roberts' counsel submitted a motion to address only her objections, along with a 
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request for an expedited hearing on her motion to combine it with a previously scheduled 
hearing to review jury instructions. See Tr. Vol. I., pp. 259-62. 
When the issue of Hansen's objections were raise at trial, the trial court ruled 
that the hearing was scheduled "for the sole purpose of editing that particular trial 
deposition." Tr. Vol. I., p. 260, LL. 20-22. The trial court ruled that Hansen's counsel 
waived any objections during the jury instructions hearing by not addressing them at the 
hearing. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 260, L. 13 and p. 263, LL. 1-8. 
Hansen's counsel raised the issue again shortly before the deposition was played 
for the jury. Hansen's counsel argued that rule 32(b) allowed a party to raise objections 
to a deposition at trial. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 286, LL. 8-14. The trial court indicated that he 
had gone back over the record of the jury instruction hearing and "I did specifically ask 
Mr. Ipsen about any objections from plaintiffs side, and he specifically said nothing 
from the plaintiff." Tr. Vol. I., p. 286, LL. 15-19. 
Contrary to the trial court's memory and its subsequent review of the record, 
Hansen's counsel did not waive the right to raise objections to Roberts' deposition 
testimony during the jury instructions hearing. After addressing Roberts' objections, the 
following exchange took place at the jury instruction hearing: 
THE COURT: Okay, all right. Now does that include everything? We covered 
everything on your motion? 
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MS. BRIZEE: We've covered everything on my motion. 
THE COURT: All right. You had not filed a motion, Mr. Ipsen? 
MR. IPSEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: I didn't think there was anything there from the plaintiffs. We had 
scheduled a jury trial conference as well. Are you both ready to do that? 
See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 249, L. 16 through p. 250, L. 1. 
The record shows that Hansen's counsel did not walve any objections to 
Roberts' deposition and it shows that the hearing was not conducted for the sole purpose 
of addressing objections to the deposition. Instead, the hearing was scheduled to review 
jury instructions. During the hearing, the trial court did not specifically ask Mr. Ipsen 
"about objections from plaintiffs side" and Mr. Ipsen did not specifically say "nothing 
from the plaintiff." Instead, the trial court specifically asked Mr. Ipsen, "You had not 
filed a motion?" Mr. Ipsen specifically answered, "No." 
The trial court erred because Hansen was not required to file a motion to address 
his objections because rule 32(b) permits a party to make objections to depositions at trial 
and Hansen's counsel did not waive his objections at the jury instruction hearing. 
A substantial amount of inadmissible evidence was introduced based on the trial 
court's erroneous ruling that Hansen waived his deposition objections. First, Roberts 
made hearsay statements regarding the amount of money the collision repair company 
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said it would cost to repair his vehicle, along with the written repair estimates. See Tr. 
Vol. I., pp. 299-302. Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by the rules of 
evidence. See Idaho R. Evid. 802. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testitying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of 
the matter asserted. See Idaho R. Evid. 801 (c). 
Receipts for repair work are inadmissible hearsay. See State v. Miller, 141 Idaho 
148, 150; 106 P.3d 474 (Idaho 2004) and Marshall v. Bare, 107 Idaho 201, 204; 687 P.2d 
591, 594 (Idaho Ct. App. 1984). Both of the foregoing cases hold that repair estimates 
are hearsay. In Marshall, a party attempted to circumvent the hearsay rule by arguing 
that the repair estimates were not offered for the truth of the matter. The Court of 
Appeals disagreed and pointed out that if the repair estimates were not introduced for the 
truth of the matter then they would be inadmissible as irrelevant. Other jurisdictions have 
issued similar opinions in cases involving the introduction of repair estimates for vehicle 
damage. See Home Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Hagar, 242 Ark. 693,415 S.W.2d 65 
(1967) and In the Interest of J T., 285 Ga. App. 465 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007). 
Second, hearsay statements made by Roberts to Hansen, police dispatch, and 
oral and written statements to the police officer were inadmissible. See Tr. Vol. I., pp. 
310-14. Roberts' counsel was under the mistaken belief that statements by her own client 
were not hearsay. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 310, LL. 24-25. The rule is that statements by a 
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party-opponent are not hearsay. See Idaho R. Evid. 801(d). None of Roberts' statements 
to Hansen, dispatch, or the police officer, including his written statement, are admissible 
because they are hearsay. 
Finally, Roberts' testimony that he did not receive a citation is inadmissible and 
violated the trial court's prior ruling on the issue. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 315, LL. 16-21. The 
trial court ordered before trial that there would be no testimony "concerning admission of 
citation. In other words, the parties will not testifY that there was a citation." See Tr. 
Vol. I., p. 51, LL. 18-23. Roberts' testimony that he did not receive a citation violates the 
court's pretrial order because it implies that Hansen received a citation since most jurors 
will believe that one of the drivers will get a citation. 
The trial court's error was not harmless because without the hearsay evidence 
regarding the repair estimates Roberts would not have had any evidence at all to support 
his damages so he would not have been awarded anything even if the jury found Hansen 
primarily at fault. Although Hansen only needs to show a probable change in the 
outcome of the trial due to the trial court's error, the lack of any evidence other than 
inadmissible hearsay to prove Roberts' damages would certainly have changed the 
outcome of trial. 
Further, the hearsay evidence regarding statements made by Roberts to the 
police officer along with his statement that he did not get a citation would probably have 
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changed the jury's apportionment of fault and either reduced Hansen's liability to Roberts 
or swung the jury all the way to Hansen's side. Importantly, the jury initially was 
considering apportioning fault 51149 but, implicit in its question to the court, it wanted to 
give Roberts some money. See Tr. Vol. I., p. 491 L. 22 through p. 492, L. 4. The jurors 
sent the following question to the court during deliberations: 
Id. 
If we decide that Larry [Hansen] is 51 percent and Matt [Roberts] is 49 
percent, would Matt still get the award amount of damages as if we did 90 
percent to 10 percent. Period or question mark. In other words, does the 
percentage matter? 
Further, only nine jurors signed the special verdict form. See R Vol. I, p. 206. 
Swaying one or two more jurors to Hansen's side or arming the pro-Hansen jurors with 
additional arguments, while at the same time reducing arguments for the pro-Roberts 
jurors, would probably have changed the dynamics of deliberations so that the jury 
apportioned more fault on Roberts than Hansen and either reduced Hansen's liability to 
Roberts or resulted in a recovery by Hansen from Roberts. Accordingly, the error was 
not harmless. 
ISSUE #3: Limitations on Voir Dire 
The trial court abused its discretion by prohibiting Hansen from inquiring whether 
a prospective juror or one of his family members were or had ever been employed by an 
insurance carrier. The standard of review for a district court's limitations on jury voir 
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dire is an abuse of discretion standard. See State v. Bitz, 93 Idaho 239, 244, 460 P.2d 
374,379 (1969). 
Voir dire is an important tool available to the parties to ensure that a fair and 
impartial jury is impaneled. Accordingly, this Court has held that "some latitude must be 
given in the matter of examining jurors on their voir dire, to enable counsel to determine 
whether or not such jurors should be challenged for implied bias, and also for obtaining 
information as to whether or not it is desirable to exercise a peremptory challenge." See 
Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., 34 Idaho 253,262; 200 P. 884, 886 (Idaho 1921). 
This Court has noted that a potential juror may be biased due to his employment. 
"It is the privilege of a party within reasonable limits and good faith, to ascertain the 
occupation of a juror and the extent of his possible interest in the trial." Byington v. 
Horton, 61 Idaho 389, 102 P.2d 652 (Idaho 1940). 
In injury cases, this Court has repeatedly held that it is the privilege of the plaintiff 
to inquire whether a prospective juror or one of his family members are or have ever been 
employed by an insurance carrier. See Wilson v. St. Joe Boom Co., 34 Idaho 253, 262; 
200 P. 884, 886 (Idaho 1921) (holding that prospective jurors are subject to inquiry 
regarding their interest in a casualty company); Cochran v. Gritman, 34 Idaho 654, 664; 
203 P. 289, 292 (Idaho 1921) (holding that counsel may ascertain whether jurors have 
interest in the result of litigation although it might show juror's connection with a 
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casualty company); Bressan v. Herrick, 35 Idaho 217, 221; 205 P. 555, 556 (Idaho 1922) 
(permitting counsel in personal injury action to ask jurors whether they had any 
connection with casualty companies); Faris v. Burroughs Adding Mach. Co., 48 Idaho 
310, 322; 282 P. 72 (Idaho 1929) (holding that statements of counsel that defendant was 
insured were not prejudicial); Shaddy v. Daley, 58 Idaho 536, 540; 76 P.2d 279, 281 
(Idaho 1938) (holding that plaintiff was within his rights in propounding question as to 
whether prospective juror is or has been employed by an insurance company); Byington 
v. Horton, 61 Idaho 389, 395; 102 P.2d 652, 654 (Idaho 1940) (same); and Owen v. 
Burcham, 100 Idaho 441,599 P.2d 1012 (Idaho 1979) (same). 
In Byington, each prospective juror was asked whether he or any member of his 
family had been employed by any insurance company engaged in the business of insuring 
against automobile accidents. This Court found the line of question proper and quoted 
from a prior decision holding, "It is entirely proper for counsel to ask the jurors such 
questions as may reasonably be necessary to ascertain whether they are free from a bias 
or interest that may affect their verdict. To this end it is proper for counsel in good faith, 
to ask of each juror whether he is interested as an agent or stockholder or otherwise in a 
specified casualty company." (quoting Faris). 
More recently, this Court reiterated that an inquiry concerning prospective jurors 
and their family members' employment or ownership interest in a casualty company is 
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pennissible. "We have held that such inquiry is permissible if made in good faith with 
the intent to expose bias and not for the purpose of informing the jury about the existence 
of the defendant's insurance." Owen v. Burcham, 100 Idaho 441,599 P.2d 1012 (Idaho 
1979). 
Notably, every time this issue is raised on appeal, it has been raised by the defense 
when the trial court has allowed such inquiries. This case raises an issue of first 
impression before this Court because in this case the trial court prohibited such inquiries. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals suggested, in dicta, that trial judges in Idaho are free 
to prohibit this line of questioning, relying on Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 831; 
828 P.2d 854, 860. See Harris v. Alessi, 141 Idaho 901, 907; 120 P.3d 289, 296 (Idaho 
Ct. App. 2005). The Court of Appeals' statement should not be adopted by this Court for 
two reasons: First, the Court of Appeals' reliance on Kozlowski was misplaced because 
the inquiry in Kozlowski was not whether a juror had an interest in an insurance company 
as an employee or stockholder, which would make the juror incompetent to serve as a 
juror. Instead, the inquiry in Kozlowski related to the jurors' exposure to anti-tort 
advertising campaigns, which would not necessarily give rise to a cause challenge. The 
Court of Appeals did not explain in Harris how a party could exercise their right to 
exclude incompetent jurors or effectively exercise peremptory challenges if questioning 
regarding jurors' interests in insurance companies was prohibited. 
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Second, the dicta in Harris seems driven by remarks in that particular case by 
plaintiffs counsel singling out a specific insurance company. See Harris, at 295. While 
the Court of Appeals' concerns are legitimate, the statement that trial courts can prohibit 
all inquiries into incompetency due to employment with an insurance carrier goes too far. 
Indeed, this Court's holdings on the subject already state that inquiries into employment 
by an insurance carrier are appropriate so long as they are not intended to signal that 
insurance is available. A simple question as to whether a juror or a juror's close family 
members have ever worked for an insurance company is innocuous, yet it provides 
plaintiffs with information necessary to determine whether a juror is competent or biased. 
In this case, Roberts moved for an order in limine prohibiting any use of the word 
insurance. Hansen's counsel objected at oral argument and argued that inquiry into 
prospective jurors' interests in insurance companies during voir dire was appropriate. 
"[S]pecificaUy, I'm thinking that if there is an insurance adjuster or someone who works 
in the insurance industry who is on the jury, I'm not sure if my client would get a fair 
trial." Tr. Vol. I, p. 22 L. 22 through p. 23, L. 5. The trial court ruled that knowledge of 
the prospective jurors and their spouses' current employment was sufficient to address 
counsel's concerns. 
Hansen's counsel again raised the issue of voir dire on the day of trial, seeking 
some latitude to inquire about jurors' interests in insurance companies. "Questions I 
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would like to explore would be the person's job history with regard to whether they ever 
worked in risk management, insurance claims as an agent or insurance adjuster, [or] 
whether they've had close family members or friends who work in the Insurance 
industry." Tr. Vol. I, p. 66, LL. 6-17. The trial court again denied this request. 
Accordingly, Hansen was precluded from learning whether a juror had previously 
worked in the insurance industry or whether other close family members - such as 
parents, children, or siblings - had ever been employed in the insurance industry. 
Also, consider that a juror may have been improperly removed for cause solely 
because she worked for Allstate. Voir dire of prospective juror, Ms. Hix, comprised all 
of three lines in the transcript. See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 71, LL. 21-24. The restriction on 
mentioning insurance precluded Hansen's counsel from inquiring whether Ms. Hix 
worked in claims or for an agent. The distinction is important because views and 
attitudes of employees in claims, whose job is to minimize liability, is significantly 
different than those who work as agents, whose job it is to extol the virtues and benefits 
of insurance to customers and prospective customers. Hansen was precluded from 
determining Ms. Hix's views on automobile insurance claims and whether she could 
fairly and impartially decide the case. Instead, Hansen had to presume that she was 
incompetent solely because she worked for Allstate so he moved the court to remove her 
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for cause. Roberts' counsel did not object and the trial court removed Ms. Hix for cause 
with no examination from defense counsel. See Tr. Vol. 1., p. 102, LL. 5-13. 
If the trial court presumed that Ms. Hix was incompetent to serve as a juror solely 
because she worked for an insurance company, it is safe to believe that a juror who 
formerly worked for an insurance company could also be biased against plaintiffs. 
Similarly, a juror whose mother or father worked as an insurance agent may also be 
biased against plaintiffs. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court erred when it 
prohibited Hansen from ascertaining whether potential jurors or their spouses had any 
prior employment with an insurance company or whether any of their close family 
members were currently or previously employed with an insurance company. The error 
was prejudicial because it prevented Hansen from eliciting bias so that he could 
effectively challenge jurors for cause or so he could better utilize his peremptory 
challenges. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Hansen requests that this Court vacate the judgment in 
favor of Roberts and remand to the trial court for a new trial. 
DATED this 19th day of January, 2012. 
Brent Gordon 
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